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*Neither Barbarian Nor Angel of Peace  
The Common European House:  
Resurrection of Change  
through Rapprochement?*

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Report on the second meeting of the  
**Aspen East-West Study Group**  
held in Paris,  
September 21-25, 1988

by Margarita Mathiopoulos

ASPEN BERLIN STUDY GROUP on "PERSPECTIVES ON A 'COMMON  
EUROPEAN HOME' WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS"

Paris Meeting, 21-25 September 1988

Neither Barbarian Nor Angel of Peace  
The Common European Home: Resurrection  
of Change through Rapprochement?\*

by Margarita Mathiopoulos

"And now," wrote the Greek poet Cavafys in 1911, "what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution." The idea of barbarism is one of the constantly recurring motifs in Europe's sociocultural consciousness. Historically, was not the term "barbarian" always a convenient expression designed to depict the enemy in terms that mobilized and closed the ranks of one's own followers and made discriminating knowledge and analysis of the alien irrelevant? The ideological gain derived from this Feindbild was appreciated even in ancient times. Barbarians were considered to be all those who could not enjoy the privilege of paideia (the rearing and education as Greek, and later Roman, citizens). In the Middle Ages, too, the motif of barbarism resurfaces. Fanatic crusades were led against the "infidels," against Huns and Arabs, Slavs and Turks! In the age of colonization, the barbarians of modern times were discovered: Indians, Africans, and Asians. Europe always stood for civilization, culture, and Christianity; the "Third World," for wilderness, barbarism, and paganism.

The modern ideologies of the twentieth century, communism and national socialism, created their new "barbarians."

The one persecuted capitalists and counterrevolutionaries; the other, non-Aryans, Jews, and Bolsheviks. With the barbarians Hitler and Stalin, however, the Europeans this time were to lose their civilized innocence, and the Germans, through the trauma of national socialism and the division of their country, were to lose their identity.

After 1945 it was shown that liberal democracies, too, need their Feindbilder. Ronald Reagan distinguished between the "evil empire" in the Soviet Union and his own country, the "good empire."

## I.

Since Mikhail Gorbachev stepped onto the world political stage in 1985, the postwar order of Europe has begun to rock. In East and West traditional Feindbilder no longer seem to apply. Gorbachev's domestic program of using glasnost and perestroika to open Russian society for "socialist pluralism" and his foreign-policy concept of letting the Brezhnev Doctrine be forgotten, of ridding the world of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and especially of building a "common European home" have recently made it immensely difficult for the West to see in him the "communist barbarian" of his predecessors. The fact that the top man in the Kremlin couches the European Question in the shimmering concept of the "common European home" and allows it to be revived at precisely this moment reflects a well-considered program.

We are in a phase of epochal change in the structures and foundations of the postwar order. True, the division of Europe is recognized as the tragic political consequence,

but it is no longer accepted as irrevocable historical fact, least of all by the Germans. If Europe is the subject of discussion today, we are no longer thinking of Western Europe alone but rather simultaneously of Eastern Europe as well. We are in a phase of seeking European identity, a search in which intellectual exercises like the Mitteleuropa-Idee, the Europeanization of NATO, and Europe for the Europeans are openly acknowledged.

Coinciding with these mounting trends toward Europe's self-assertion is a relative decline of American hegemony, despite Reagan's psychological rhetoric of strength so reminiscent of the Cold War era. Interesting examples of the purported decline of the United States as a world power are found in the pessimistic literature of the Americans Alan Bloom, Paul Kennedy, and David Calleo.

What does Mikhail Gorbachev want from us Europeans? The term "European home" is not even his. It was Leonid Brezhnev who used it for the first time during his visit in Bonn in November 1981. His foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, repeated the metaphor in January 1983, also in Bonn. Neither politician caused a stir with it, however. The "European home" did not become a key word of Soviet domestic and foreign policy until Gorbachev. The general secretary elegantly formulated the new Soviet philosophy in April 1987:

We now turn ourselves decidedly against the division of the continent into mutually opposed military blocks, against the arsenal of weapons piled up here, against everything that is a source of the threat of war. In light of the new thinking, we have introduced the idea of the common European home. That is no beautiful fantasy; it is the result of a serious analysis of the situation on this continent.

Just what is this "serious analysis of the situation"? What are Gorbachev's motives when he speaks of, entices with, and pushes for the "European home"? Three basic considerations seem to be evident from his speeches and actions thus far.

First, the general secretary knows that in a world characterized by an increasing internationalization of the markets the Soviet Union can remain a great power in the long term only if she can tap into the high technology and economic power of the West. That is why Gorbachev must enlist the Americans, and especially the West Europeans, for his policy of modernizing the Soviet economy. Moscow no longer aims for subjugation of the West, much less for military occupation. The objective is to use technological and economic know-how for the Soviet Union. That will work, however, only if military confrontation is replaced by a community in Europe that is oriented toward peaceful cooperation.

Why should that not succeed? Did not a Russian politician over three-hundred years ago, Peter the Great, successfully undertake the risk of opening Russia to the West? Parallels come to mind. Like today, the Russia of the late seventeenth century was totally backwards, having fallen in every way far behind the great powers of the day--the Netherlands, England, and Sweden. Even Prussia was preening herself to become an able great power. Like Gorbachev today, Peter the Great also believed that Russia could catch up only by opening up to the West. Thus he travelled as czar and carpenter to the West and with his staff gathered modern knowledge, bringing to his country

experts ranging from shipbuilders, architects, and military strategists to philosophers (Leibnitz). Then as now, there were forces in the West that were receptive to his policy, forces that readily took up the offer for cooperation. But there were also "infidels" who did not think Peter capable of anything and who did not want to believe in a change in Russia. To them, the Russian bear would always remain the Russian bear. Similarly, there were conservative forces then just as there are now, an opposition at home. Peter the Great's modernization plans were obstructed by the boyars (the aristocracy) and the Orthodox Church. Without hesitation, Peter made all his adversaries, except priests, shave off their beards, the symbols of anachronism. Whoever refused to obey the new law had to pay a beard tax. Eventually, Peter prevailed in his new thinking. Today, Gorbachev must struggle against the party apparatus and mismanagement. The role of the boyars has been assumed by the bureaucrats; that of the Orthodox Church, by the ideologists of Marxist-Leninism.

Will Mikhail's new thinking also prevail? Like Peter, Gorbachev will bring western experts and managers into his country as the Chinese have been practicing for years. Schools for the training of Soviet managers have been under discussion for over a year. Close economic cooperation with the Federal Republic (Deutsche Bank, Salamander, Liebherr, and Burda, for example) is flourishing, and new businesses can be expected to result from Helmut Kohl's official visit to the Soviet Union this fall. The German foreign minister just brought home a new project from his recent trip to

Moscow. If all goes well, Siemens will supply the entire Soviet Union with a digital telecommunications system.

How strongly economic goals influence the thesis of the "European home" is shown by Gorbachev's book, Pere-stroika:

The building of the "European home" requires a material foundation. . . . The economic, scientific, and technical potential of Europe is tremendous. It is dispersed, . . . However, the current state of affairs economically within in the West and the East, and their tangible prospects, are such as to enable some modus to be found for a combination of economic processes in both parts of Europe for the benefit of all. . . . True, all this would increase the European states' interdependence, but this would be to the advantage of everyone and would make for greater responsibility and self-restraint.

Second, to make the desired improvements in economic and scientific cooperation for rehabilitating the moribund Soviet economy, the general secretary must convince the Europeans that he is serious about his desire for peace. Herein lies a further motive for propagating a "European home." It is intended to make détente irreversible, to remove structures of confrontation and thereby allay West European fear that an intensification of economic cooperation would ultimately only strengthen a dangerous adversary. Gorbachev's almost monthly disarmament proposals--including the especially tempting idea of a nuclear-free zone--to take the enormous sums consumed year after year by the Soviet arms budget and redirect them into the Soviet economy are intended to underline the pacific, defensive character of Soviet military doctrine. Hence, Gorbachev needs a peaceful "European home" in order to build confidence for cooperation with the West and to free new resources for the sweeping modernization of his country. Moscow's about-face on the issue of medium-range missiles, which ultimately made the



INF treaty possible, the willingness signalled by the Warsaw Pact to negotiate away asymmetries in conventional arms in Europe, the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan, and the Kremlin's constructive attitude in regional conflicts such as those in South Africa, Cambodia, or the Near East are impressive signs of a new Soviet policy of disengagement--in their own interest.

Third, with the idea of the "European home" Gorbachev is pursuing the domestic objective of consciously portraying the Soviet Union as a European power so as to bring the explosive nationality problems of the Soviet republics under control and to cement the predominance of the European-Russian element over the Asiatic parts of the Soviet republics. Like Peter the Great, who wanted to stem the disintegration of the heterogeneous Russian empire by Europeanizing Russia, Gorbachev is utterly determined to hold the multinational Russian state together by Europeanizing the Soviet Union. This Bündelstaat is not supposed to suffer the same fate of gradual disintegration that befell the Osman and Habsburg empires. For Gorbachev, who was born on the edge of Asia (Stavropol), the issue that seems to be of greatest importance is that of allowing the European consciousness of the various Russian nationalities to revive under a European roof and thereby maintain power and influence over them. The revaluation of the Orthodox Church can also be explained in this context. It was not out of liberalism that Gorbachev received the patriarch but rather for the purpose of underlining European awareness of tradition that the head of Orthodoxy embodies. Times are changing. If the Church was a conservative obstacle to Peter's plans for modernization,

it seems to be a welcome means for achieving the goals of Gorbachev's European policy. The general secretary leaves no doubt about the European heritage of the Soviet Union:

We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe through Christianity, and the millennium<sup>was</sup> of its arrival in the land of our ancestors ~~marked~~ marked the ~~next~~ year.<sup>1489</sup> The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history. The Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, Karelians, and other peoples of our country have all made a sizeable contribution to the development of European civilization. They thus justifiably regard themselves as its rightful heirs.

Still, the question remains of whether and to what extent the Soviet Union is a European power from her history and culture, whether the USSR is reckoned as part of the "Central European cultural realm" or whether she must be placed in an "uncivilized" Asiatic tradition and "barbaric counterculture" hostile to human rights and liberalism of the European stamp, as stressed by Vice President George Bush in Vienna in September 1983. Bush pointedly stated that Russia had not been part of the three great intellectual currents of Europe (the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment). Gorbachev did not go into these aspects until April 1987 in Prague: "In Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, western civilization was enriched by the ideas of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and experienced powerful development through the humanist tradition and theory of socialism." Can the "European home" thus also be seen as a part and source of Russian-Soviet identity?

Soviet imperialism seems to be bidding farewell to its earlier expansionist adventurism around the globe. Is that also true for the relation between Moscow and Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries? Does the Kremlin in fact

increasingly feel them to be a "pain in the neck," as a Soviet academic of a renowned Moscow institute recently whispered in West Berlin? Is even a Finlandization of Eastern Europe desired?

## II.

Certainly, Gorbachev's vision of a "common European home" has fired the imagination of many contemporaries in the West. His new Westpolitik has not met with universal acclaim, however. A number of critical voices in Washington, Paris, and London have greeted his political European offensive with justified skepticism.

First, just as the Brezhnev Doctrine's has so far served as a strategy to contain the East Europeans, so can the policy of building a "common European home" now be considered Gorbachev's Doctrine of containing the Americans in Europe, if not of eventually ousting them from the Old World altogether. Skeptics think that Moscow is consciously trying to drive a wedge into the Atlantic alliance. Above all, it is completely unclear what role, if any, the United States and Canada--the non-European powers that are politically and militarily involved on the Old Continent--are intended to play in a "European home." Despite Gorbachev's repeated reassurances that the United States and Canada would naturally have their place in the "European home," it is uncertain which part the Americans would have in building this currently abstract living arrangement, who would determine the rules of coexistence, how the property relationships and communication between the individual parties should be regulated, and finally, which security measures would exist. For the time being, the "European home"

resembles a "residential idyll" with a wall and barbed wire in the garden and a "deep trench passing through a common living room," as President Richard von Weizsäcker commented to Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1987; there are sharpshooters and trained German shepherds in the cellar, and visiting restrictions are imposed.

Second, the idea of a "European home" can be interpreted as an attempt to thwart Western European efforts at unification, to check their élan in seeking to create what could ultimately become the United States of Europe, at least of Western Europe, a federal state with an executive of sovereign discretionary power in matters of foreign policy. No doubt, Western Europe has become economically stronger and politically more self-assured in the 1980s. The southward expansion of the EC as well as applications from neutral states can be expected in the near future. The European monetary system, the liberalization of capital transactions within the Community, and the great strides taken toward an internal European Market by 1992 indicate a new drive in Western Europe. Whereas pessimism about alleged Eurosclerosis spread at the beginning of this decade and the Europeans were on the verge of losing heart in the face of rapid technological developments of the international markets, the end of the 1980s have been accompanied by palpable Europhoria. The revival of the Western European Union, the possibility of upgrading it to a second pillar of Europe within NATO, and the expansion of German-French partnership in security matters are an expression of an growing self-assuredness. Is one really to believe that the Soviet Union could be prepared to sit idly by and watch the states

of Western Europe, largely deprived of political power since the Second World War, coalesce into a modern superpower of greater economic and military strength? An economically wealthy but politically and militarily impotent Western Europe under American hegemony is, and has been, unobjectionable for Moscow. But having Western Europe as a unified, sovereign entity bordering directly on the states of the Warsaw Pact, where processes of creeping disintegration can no longer be concealed, while at the same time having to pay greater and greater attention to the rise of China and more than ever to that of Japan seems to be rather a nightmare for Gorbachev. Looking at Europe as a whole is intended to distract the West Europeans.

Third, western diplomatic circles in the State Department and the Quai d'Orsay suspect that a new Deutschlandpolitik is concealed behind the Kremlin's new Europapolitik. According to this line of thinking, Moscow is at best intent on motivating Bonn to adopt a policy that is more independent of Washington and to enter into closer relations with the Soviet Union--not without interesting offers, of course. At worst, one can expect the reopening of the German question in order to neutralize the Federal Republic and thereby prevent a complete integration of Western Europe. Reason for concern was given recently by Soviet experts on Germany themselves when they spoke candidly about German reunification, disguised in the metaphor of the "European home" with two demilitarized German apartments for the time being and about dynamic possibilities for change in the status of Berlin. The current head of Nowosti and former Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, for example, put the

current status of Berlin up for discussion in a television interview by the German television network ZDF in September 1987, something that called no one to the scene except Erich Honecker, the chairman of the GDR Council of State.

A comment that came across much more pointedly was that of Stanislav Chernyovski, a Soviet diplomat with the United Nations in Geneva. Speaking before NATO military chaplains in September 1987, he euphorically declared: "I believe that this wall will soon no longer exist. It has reached its final days." Not until two weeks later, probably after persistent entreaties by East Berlin, did the Kremlin feel pressed to have the speaker of the foreign ministry, Gerasimov, to label Chernyovski's statement tersely as future oriented.

The most inviting views of Germany's future, however, are drawn by the Central Committee consultant Portugalov, former a Nowosti correspondent in Bonn:

The continued building and completion of the common European home would open opportunities that, I think, should please the Federal Republic. It is not difficult to imagine that the inhabitants of both German apartments--sovereign and independent--could maintain close mutual relations after all even if each were to live in his own way, all the more so since they speak the same language. And then the time would also come to finally free the apartments in the center part of the home from foreign military billets.

The European Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow founded under the direction of Vitaly Shurkin this year, is not only to elaborate on Gorbachev's grand design for a "European home" with specific proposals but also to develop a new policy toward Germany.

And the Soviets cannot afford to wait much longer with it, for in the wake of the internal European market to be

created in 1992, the point of no return for the merging of the Federal Republic with the other EC states could very quickly be reached and passed. After much soul-searching, Moscow would have bring itself to do it, even if giving up the GDR as a strategic bastion would in effect also mean forfeiting direct control over Poland and Czechoslovakia. From the Soviet point of view, however, a great gain offsetting this would be (a) the removal of the Federal Republic from the impending political integration and union of the EC states--for example, through military neutrality of all of Germany, to be guaranteed in the framework of a European-wide peace agreement; (b) the concomitant condition of an end to any notable military presence of the United States on the continent of Europe; (c) the shrinking of the EC, with its latent aspiration for the integration of all Europe west of the Soviet Union, to a purely Western European community of limited power and perhaps also withered institutions; and (d) virtually complete alleviation of all military problems from Finland to the Caucasus through the denuclearization of Europe.

Fourth, Americans such as former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance (see Foreign Affairs) charge that Gorbachev's détente-centered policy toward Europe only aims to realize its "communist commonwealth" with western economic and technological aid. In fact, comments like those uttered by a Moscow government advisor, Vyacheslav Dashitchev, in May 1988 underscore the Americans' fears:

Socialism has already been transformed into an insuperable force. From the standpoint not only of preserving the peace but also of furthering the development of world socialism, that is why it is essential for the focus of the struggle for social progress to be shifted from the realm of interna-

tional relations between the USSR and the West back to the realm of the internal sociopolitical development of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, the states of the West, and the "Third World." . . . Restoring the full significance of this Leninist idea is one of the noble objectives of perestroika. (Literaturnaya Gazyeta, 18 May 1988)

As long as Moscow's objective remains to develop world communism further, American members of Congress such as Democratic senator Bill Bradley recommend that their European, especially German, colleagues advocate investment in the young democracies of Portugal and Spain instead of propagating a Marshall Plan for the East. For the United States itself, doing business with the East has always been dependent on Basket III of the CSCE, in other words, progress on the issue of human rights.

### III.

Mikhail Gorbachev the communist asserts that "we need democracy like the air to breathe." Can one brand him as a "barbarian"? "No, Gorbachev renders it impossible to return to tyranny," assures the well-known dissident Milovan Djilas. Gorbachev's concept of popular freedom of choice, his recognition of national autonomy and independence, and his subordination of the idea of class struggle to that of general human values discredits the clinging to those Feindbilder that are based on the immutability of totalitarian systems. To be sure, it would be illusory to expect the Soviet Union to become a state modelled on the western pattern overnight. But denying her the chance to prove the sincerity of her will to change would not be fair.

Yet neither does the West, particularly the Americans, want to anoint Gorbachev as the "Angel of Peace." Joseph



Nye, a Harvard professor and possible security advisor in a Dukakis administration, caricatured the relations between the two great powers by saying that "the superpowers sleep in the same bed, but they still dream different dreams." Richard Nixon, too, who was the first postwar American president to lay the cornerstones for true détente with the Soviet Union--which Moscow did not appreciate for long, however--warns in his new book, 1999: Victory without War, to be cautious in dealing with the Soviet general secretary. "Gorbachev is the antithesis of the bearded Bolshevik, but he still believes Communism is the wave of the future." Nixon's views are shared not only by the people in the present American administration but also by France's socialists and England's conservatives!

Only in Bonn is anyone swooning of late, is anyone thinking about Russia. The Chancellor's inadvertent, embarrassing comparison between Gorbachev and Goebbels has been forgotten. The visit that President Richard von Weizsäcker made to the Soviet Union last year opened a new chapter in German-Soviet relations while preparing the terrain for Helmut Kohl's trip to Moscow this year. In the run-up to Kohl's visit, one of the Chancellor's foreign policy advisors, Teltschik, has proclaimed that the overall climate is now better than ever, that the relation between East and West has enormous impetus. As learned during the foreign minister's preliminary trip to the Soviet capital, Gorbachev and Genscher expressed the view that the German-Soviet relationship has a "key role" in the relations within Europe and between East and West as a whole and that Shevardnazy, satisfied by the course of the discussion with his colleague

from Bonn, said: "In Europe a unified language is gradually being found."

Do not just such attempts at rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow, enriched by scenarios of a denuclearized Europe stretching from Poland to Portugal or from the Atlantic to the Urals, a Europe of nuclear disarmament and conventional, nonoffensive defense, repeatedly give cause for alarm in Washington, Paris, London, or Rome? True, the constant wooing of the Federal Republic of Germany goes back to Krushchev's and Brezhnev's times, but with Gorbachev's offer of a pan-European home and the real possibility of reopening the German Question, the courting has become far more fervent. Is it not this aspect that makes Bonn's friends skeptical? The fear that not just the Greens but meanwhile also broader circles in the Federal Republic would not be able to resist a Soviet offer of neutrality combined with the reunification of the two German states is not altogether absurd when one considers that the CDU, in preparing for its party convention this year, discussed at length whether "reunification" should be pursued and implemented only with or, if need be, even against the western partners. Conservative politicians of the Right have recently been giving increasingly free rein to their national sentiments, a few examples being Lummer ("the neutrality of Germany as the price for a reunification"), Friedmann ("Unity Instead of Missiles: Theses on Reunification as a Security Concept"), Todenhöfer ("Reunification first, Unity of Europe second"), and Defense Minister Scholz, who described the reunification of the nation as the highest priority and who proudly said in an interview that appeared in the German

weekly Der Spiegel: ". . . the unity of the German nation is one of the most important elements and resources of Europe and her identity" (No. 28, 1988).

The fact that Gorbachev had gained more trust and popularity in West Germany than in East Germany (which speaks for him!) is also proven by the latest opinion surveys of the Allensbacher Institute. The European neighbors, however, are bound to be alarmed by the numbers indicating a growing problem of acceptance regarding defense. In August 1987, 50% of the West Germans polled were for unilateral western disarmament (compared to 35% in May 1982); only 28% were opposed. On the question of whether Bonn should continue standing close by America's side, 32% of the respondents answered "yes" in December 1987 (compared to 56% in November 1980), whereas 44% were more in favor of neutrality toward both great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

These creeping changes in the attitudes of many Germans since the beginning of the 1980s reflect an increasing unease about the concentration of weapons, particularly nuclear ones, and soldiers in the heart of Europe. In a generally relaxed East-West climate along with ongoing disarmament negotiations, who dares to convince the Germans that they, of all people, should deploy new weapons as part of the modernization concept for the short-range missile system in order to serve as a potential "Brandmauer" so to speak? Many West Germans are very sensitive about the macabre thesis that "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." They feel deprived of their self-determination, dependent, and threatened by allied weapons and military on

their territory, all of which constitutes a potential powderkeg for the alliance. Of course, such tendencies are reinforced by American studies like "discriminate deterrence," which suggest the nuclear decoupling of the United States from the European theater of war and seem to shift the burden of the nuclear risk to the Europeans alone. Is it not understandable in such a situation that the Germans seek new options for security--without the United States--as unrealistic as this might be given the experiences of post-war history? Is it not understandable that they do not want to resist the temptation, accompanied perhaps also by promises of national integrity, of slipping under the ostensibly safe roof of a "European home"? Could not a fundamentally new political order entailing the withdrawal of super-power troops from Central Europe make for a more secure peace for all of Europe? The American historian Gordon A. Craig recently pursued this thought sarcastically at the 15th Frankfurt Römerberg Discussion when he asked what the Europeans might do if the "barbarians" in East and West, the Soviet Union and the United States, simply pulled out of Central Europe.

As inappropriate as illusions about Gorbachev's "new thinking" are, a panic-stricken search for the lost Feindbilder is just as undue. The West is in better shape than ever before. It was not its arsenal of nuclear weapons that impressed the East but rather its ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights. They have been shown to be stronger than Communist dogma. The proof is in the inexorable revolution of reform in the entire East. If it succeeds without bloodshed, then a new chapter in human history will have

commenced. Gorbachev's Russian dream of the "common European home" could become the grand design for a European reality in the twenty-first century.

For the time being, however, work must continue on three tasks of vital importance for Europe. First, the shared political foundations of the alliance between Western Europe and the United States must be nurtured. The strength and the concomitant reinforcement of common ground in the West, the historical, political, and cultural ties between Europe and America, have been the basic pillars of the "transatlantic home" for forty years. It would be foolish to want to give that up intentionally today. After all, America, born of the ideals of the European Enlightenment, is also a European power. With utmost matter-of-factness and composure, the deputy ambassador to NATO, John Kornblum, then the U.S. minister in Berlin, stated on April 26, 1987: "when the West is clear and united, then one can go ahead and live in a 'common European home.' We are a European power, too; we are also a European people. We feel at home here in Europe."

The second task is to progress with Western Europe's political, economic, and especially military self-assertion in addition to the Atlantic friendship--not least also in order to take into account the financial relief that the Americans themselves desire from the Old Continent. As put by the director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, Francois Heisbourg, the West Europeans "should begin to act as befits them: as a community of 320 million people who produce more than the United States and twice as much as the Soviet Union or Japan, as a community that has a

good starting position." That is also true for building a Western European nuclear-based defense with its own deterrent capacity that tomorrow could become the second pillar of a reformed NATO. An approach for the eventual Europeanization of French nuclear weapons could already lie in the agreements on the Franco-German security partnership in recent years. French guarantees of security are enormously important for the Federal Republic because they could effectively reduce German vulnerability to Soviet security overtures. Of course, the latest anti-European statements by the head of state in London make it clear that strides toward Europeanizing the British nuclear potential are definitely unlikely until a post-Thatcher era.

Lastly, the third task enables the Europeans to do away with their Feindbild of the barbarian and to pursue and intensify a policy of system-opening cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki accords. As stressed by Foreign Minister Genscher recently in Potsdam:

Under no circumstances can one see why the people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are no less skilled than those in other parts of Europe, should not aim at results like ours given a modern economic system. The West must not see this possibility as a danger; it must see it as a chance, a chance to build a European order of peace and a chance for its own economy.

Moreover, in view of the great challenges of the future--environmental catastrophes, energy supply, population explosion, underdevelopment--which are steadily acquiring a strategic significance as well, closer cooperation between East and West has become essential.

All those who degrade the Helsinki process to a playground of the Europeans have not understood that the CSCE Final Act of 1975 is the most important historical document

of European postwar policy, for (a) it can be considered as the charter of the European peace-order, (b) it is the only realistic process for overcoming the division of Europe if the principles of the three baskets are consistently implemented, (c) it makes a common and coherent Western Ostpolitik <sup>(possible)</sup> (d) in the wake of the great thrust of economic and social reform and modernization in the East it gives the Europeans the chance to understand themselves as a learning community, and (e) it can serve as the cornerstone for a "common European home," while its principles can serve as impulses for formulating the rules of the house.

In fact, the road to the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki began in the early 1970s by the East-West agreements negotiated by the Social-Liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt. In retrospect, it can be said that the Helsinki process is nothing other than the realization of the classic foreign-policy maxims during the Brandt era: change through rapprochement. If the Americans were concerned in 1975 that the CSCE would slowly but surely dissolve NATO, it looks today rather as if the CSCE is softening the Warsaw Pact. Building a "common European home" based on the Helsinki process could open the chance for the Europeanization of the Soviet Union and the Finlandization of Eastern Europe. The idea of gradual change toward freedom can no longer be stemmed.